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Abstract
Empirical papers show that labor income and capital income are dif-
ferently taxed all over the world. We investigate whether this may corre-
spond to individual preferences. We tackle this question in an overlapping
generations general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents: young
versus old and low skilled versus high skilled individuals. Taxes …nance
unemployment bene…ts and government consumption. High skilled agents
prefer capital income taxes, while young unskilled and old agents prefer
labor income taxation.
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11 Introduction
Why does labor income tax di¤er from capital income tax? And why is this
di¤erence not similar across countries? Indeed, labor income is more taxed than
capital income in Europe, while it is the contrary in the US. Recent empirical
papers (for instance, Tabellini and Daveri (1997)) show that in 1976-91, the
e¤ective tax rate on labor reached 40.5% in Europe (and 27.7% in US), while
the e¤ective tax rate on capital was only 32.9% in Europe (and 42.2% in US)
over the same period.
The questions concerning the level of income taxation and their e¤ects have
been treated in so far in various ways by the literature. Some authors try to
determine the growth-maximizing …scal policy and conclude to the optimality
of a zero capital income tax in the long run (see Judd (1985), Chamley (1994),
Bertola (1993)). Another stream of literature has adopted the point of view of a
central planner whose objective is to maximize the social welfare such as Ordover
and Phelps (1975, 1976, 1979) and Ranzagas (1989). The optimal taxation mix
is the one that minimizes the marginal welfare cost of redistribution.
Several authors have endogenized taxation through political mechanism.
The models related to this theoretical stream di¤er by their initial motiva-
tion, the characteristics of the …scal policy and by the type of voters considered.
Krusell and Rios-Rull (1994) study how …scal and political constitutions in‡u-
ence the equilibrium tax rate, economic growth and welfare. For this purpose,
they develop a neoclassical growth model where in…nitely-lived agents voting for
a unique tax applying to both capital and labor income. Fiaschi (1999) focus-
ing on the correlation between inequality and growth considers in…nitely lived
agents, heterogeneous in terms of their initial capital and labor endowments.
They vote for taxes on capital income and labor income that are linked through
an optimality condition at steady state. Persson and Tabellini (1994) examine
a political model of taxation where agents di¤ering by their time endowment
vote for labor income tax and capital tax linked by the budget constraint. They
2mainly focus on the way political institutions can solve the ‘capital levy problem’.
Renström (1996) develops an overlapping generation framework of endogenous
taxation where young individuals have di¤erent skill level and bequest motives.
However, they vote today for a tax rate that will be levied only tomorrow.
They conclude that the level of tax depends on the median bequest motive. In
Bassetto (1999), the heterogeneity is related to the age of the agents and the
political determination of …scal policy takes the form of a bargaining between
generations.
This paper …ts in the political economy approach. Our purpose is to focus
on the preferences of individuals and the potential inter- and intragenerational
con‡icts concerning the optimal taxation mix of capital income tax and labor
income tax. There are two main sources of observable heterogeneity across
individuals in modern societies: di¤erences in age and in income. As a conse-
quence of this double heterogeneity, disparities of preferences are likely to arise
regarding labor and capital income tax, the former hitting mostly the young and
middle-age, the latter hitting relatively more the old. Old individuals do not
work, which makes them a relatively homogeneous voting group that may have
a relevant political power. Young individuals di¤er by their skill level, hence
their wage. This heterogeneity and the existence of an unemployment bene…t
may generate various optimal taxation mixes. On one hand, tax rates will a¤ect
di¤erently the labor supply decision of each individual. On the other hand, each
individual may value di¤erently the change in capital income taxation that is
necessary to balance the government budget constraint.
We develop a general equilibrium model in a steady state settings. We
consider a double heterogeneity: individuals di¤er by the generations they belong
to and by their economic skills. Labor supply is endogenized in a way we believe
to be close to the actual individual behavior: when young, agents must decide,
not the amount of time they will work but rather whether they will work or get
an unemployment allocation. The government taxes labor and capital income
in order to …nance its consumption and a social security system with a transfer
3to the unemployed and a transfer to the old. The level of these expenditures is
assumed to be …xed so that the labor income and capital income tax are linked
through the government budget constraint. Young and old individuals choose
a …scal policy, which will be valid today and tomorrow. After having expressed
their optimal preferences for a tax combination, individuals will decide to work
or to remain unemployed. In a third stage, they will smooth their consumption
over their remaining lifetime.
This model allows us to investigate the preferences of agents (young versus
old, low skilled versus high skilled) over the taxation method to …nance a given
social security system. Hence, the preferences of agents do not depend on the
level of the e¤ects of the taxation, on the level of social transfers, nor on the
price e¤ects. They rather depend on the direct income e¤ects of each taxa-
tion method and on the indirect e¤ects on the labor supply and hence on the
government budget. Despite the heterogeneity of young individuals, we found
that they are normally divided in only two categories according to their pref-
erences, independently of their employment status. High-skilled young agents
will mostly prefer a zero labor income tax, while low skilled will favor a very
low capital income tax. On the other hand, old individuals are homogeneous
in their choice and all favor the same taxation policy.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the economic
model and solve the consumer’s problem. In section 3, we analyze the prefer-
ences over taxation of old and young individuals with various skill levels. In
section 4, we illustrate the theoretical predictions with speci…c realistic values.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Economic Environment
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations
of heterogeneous individuals, who live for two periods1. Time t is discrete and
1Each period representing approximately 30 years.
4goes from 0 to 1.
2.1 The Production Side
Firms in economy produce one good using a linear production technology, as-
sumed to be the same in each period:
F(Kt;Lt) = RKt +wLt (1)
with Kt and Lt the input of physical and human capital at time t,
R = 1 + r the gross interest rate assuming full depreciation of capital
each period,
and w the wage per e¢ciency unit of labor.
This linear production function is chosen on simplicity grounds. It leads to
constant factor prices (w;1+r) and allows to focus on the political preferences
regarding to two di¤erent taxing methods, while keeping the economic structure
simple.
2.2 The Consumer Side
Individuals are heterogeneous: they belong to two generations and have di¤erent
innate production skills e: Skill level e is a continuous variable distributed on the
support (0;1) according to a uniform probability density function f(e), which
is constant over time.
The population (Nt) is assumed to grow at a constant rate n:
Nt+1 = Nt(1 +n) (2)
Each individual e lives for two periods, only works in the …rst period and
consumes in both periods. He is assumed to have the following homothetic
5lifetime utility function de…ned over consumption when young (ce) and old (de):
Ve = lnce +¯ lnde (3)
where ¯ < 1 is the subjective discount factor. With this speci…cation, the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is equal to one.
In the …rst period, each individual can be employed or unemployed. If em-
ployed, he earns wage income net of taxes (ew(1¡¿L)) with ¿L the labor income
tax rate, identical in every period. Individual labor supply is set equal to one.
If unemployed, he earns an unemployment subsidy b, which is not taxable. In
the second period, each individual is retired. When old, he earns a return net of
taxes of (1+r (1¡¿K)) on savings made when young (se), with ¿K the capital
income tax rate, not changing over time. He consumes his entire income and
does not leave bequests.
Under these assumptions, the individual budget constraints of a young and
old individual e respectively are:
ce +se = ew(1 ¡ ¿L)¹ +b(1 ¡ ¹) (4)
de = se(1 +r (1 ¡¿K)) (5)
with ¹ a dummy variable equal to one when employed and to zero when
unemployed.
Each individual will smooth his consumption over time in order to maximize
his lifetime utility:
MAXse ln [ew(1 ¡ ¿L)¹ +b(1 ¡ ¹) ¡ se] +¯ ln[se(1 + r(1 ¡¿K))]
s.t. (4) and (5).
6Using the …rst order condition, we can compute the optimal savings of the









Savings depend positively on education level e, on the subjective discount
factor ¯ , but negatively on the labor income tax rate. With a log-linear utility
function, the marginal propensity to save is independent on the interest rate,
hence on capital income tax.






Savings are always positive with w; b > 0 and 0 · ¿L · 1.
To determine if he will work or not, individual with skill e compares the














(b · R)] (8)
with · R = 1 + r (1 ¡¿K)
^ w = w(1 ¡¿L)
Equation (8) implies that individual e is employed if his after-tax wage is
above the unemployment subsidy (b), namely if his skill is above some minimum





We notice that demin
d¿L > 0 and d
2emin
d(¿L)2 > 0 for every ¿L > 0.












7Human capital is provided by a fraction of the young. It depends negatively
on the labor income taxation: the higher the labor income tax rate, the higher
emin, and the lower the labor supply.
De…nition 1 Since emin · 1, there exists an upper bound for ¿L above which
all young individuals will be unemployed : ¿L
max = 1 ¡ b
w.
2.3 Market equilibrium and dynamics
The equilibrium path of the economy is characterized by the market clearing














) + b emin)] (12)
The physical capital stock in t + 1 is determined by aggregate savings (S¤
t)




















Note that the growth rate of aggregate savings only depends on the growth
rate of population, because the linear production function excludes price e¤ects.
When labor income taxation is changed, the economy jumps from one steady-
state to another in the period after the modi…cation. The steady state capital
















Government insures a minimum income guarantee to every individual. In order
to …nance the unemployment subsidies and its consumption (g denoting the
8constant per capita government consumption), the government levies taxes on
labor and capital income. The government has four instruments (¿L; ¿K; b;
g) and must balance the budget every period. Consequently, the two tax rates
must satisfy in each period the following government budget constraint:








K r kt = 0 (14)
with kt denoting the per capita capital stock in period t. We constrain the
tax rates to be positive and smaller than one (0 · ¿L · 1 and 0 · ¿K · 1).
Capital income tax can be expressed as a function of ¿L:

















where capital stock is replaced by its steady state value.
This equation (15) shows that to every ¿L corresponds one unique ¿K, for
given prices (r; w) and given government expenditures (g , b):
An increase in labor income tax will produce an ambiguous e¤ect on the
capital income tax necessary to …nance given government expenditures:
d©(¿L)
d¿L =
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First, the rise in labor income tax increases the revenue raised from each
worker, which allows to reduce the taxation on capital income (¡w
2 (1¡emin
2)).
However, increasing the taxation of labor income lowers the incentives to work,
decreasing by this way the number of contributors to the system and increasing




9requires an increase of the capital income taxation. Third, a higher labor income
tax reduces the per capita capital stock, hence the tax basis for capital taxation.
This capital accumulation e¤ect is re‡ected in the third term of the brackets
in the above expression. The sign of the total e¤ect depends on the relative
importance of the three components, which in turn depends on the parameters
values (b, w, g) and on the value of ¿L. Since d2emin
d(¿L)2 > 0, the higher is ¿L,
the larger will be the positive labor supply e¤ect. When ¿L is equal to ¿L
max
(= 1¡ b
w), only the positive labor supply e¤ect remains. In addition, the higher
the ratio b
w, the larger will be the labor supply e¤ect relatively to the revenue
and capital accumulation e¤ects. On the other hand, the larger the government
expenditures, the larger the capital accumulation e¤ect will be.
The revenue e¤ect dominates for ¿L close to zero i¤ the unemployment
subsidies and the government consumption are not too large:
d©(¿L)
















The condition on b
w insures that g is not negative. See appendix 1 for a
proof.
We will suppose that this condition is always satis…ed. For very small ¿L,
the labor supply and capital accumulation e¤ects do not overcome the revenue
e¤ect, so that an increase in the labor income tax allows a reduction in the
capital income tax.
Condition (17) together with
d©(¿L)
d¿L j¿L=¿L
max > 0 and the continuity of ©(¿L)
for 0 < ¿L < 1 ¡ b
w imply:
Proposition 2 I¤ g < w
2 ; there exists a unique labor income tax ¿L
¡ that min-
imizes the capital income tax. It is de…ned by the following condition:
d©(¿L
¡)
d¿L = 0 and 0 < ¿L
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See appendix 1 for a proof. The condition on g insures that the government
consumption is not too large in comparison to the tax basis so that it can be
…nanced with a combination of tax between 0 and 1.
3 Individual preferences over taxation
This section analyzes the preferences of individuals regarding to their optimal
combination of capital income tax and labor income tax to …nance such a se-
curity system, abstracting from any strategic consideration. We investigate
whether the actual breakdown of taxation burden between labor income and
capital income re‡ects the preferences of the majority of individuals or the
choices of some of them.
To be able to de…ne the preferences of individuals over a combination of two
tax rates, we link them via the budget constraint. We suppose the unemploy-
ment bene…t b as well as the current government consumption g …xed. We do
not look at the level of the social security allocations but we investigate the pref-
erences of individuals over the taxation mix aimed at …nancing this given social
security system. Their preferences will then depend on the e¤ects of taxation
on the labor supply (hence on the government budget) and on the redistributive
characteristics of each taxation method.
Two di¤erent categories of individuals must be considered: old and young
individuals.
Regarding their taxation preferences, old individuals arehomogeneous. They
will choose the combination of tax rates that maximizes their utility in their last
period of life.
11When examining the preferences of young agents over the breakdown of the
taxation burden, we assume that agents expect this breakdown to prevail next
period as well. Young individuals di¤er by their skill level, which a¤ects their
decision to work or not, and may therefore have di¤erent optimal choices. Since
the tax combination in‡uences the labor supply decision, the determination of
the optimal tax combination for each young individual requires two steps. First,
he determines the optimal tax combination in case he works and in case he is
unemployed. Second, he compares his utility in each of these situations. The
optimal tax rate for this young individual will be the tax combination that gives
him the highest utility.
3.1 The optimal tax choice of old individuals (¿L¤
o ;¿K¤
o )
Old individuals care only about current consumption and maximize their utility
in period zero:
V o
e = lnde = ln[se(1 + r(1 ¡¿K))]
s.t.















0 · ¿K · 1 and 0 · ¿L · 1 .
Old do not support labor taxation anymore and their utility is strictly de-
creasing in ¿K. Hence, the tax combination that maximizes their welfare will
be the one that minimizes the capital income taxation, while respecting the
government budget constraint. They choose:
If 0 · ©(¿L









o = 0 and ¿L¤
o ´ Min {¿L : ©(¿L) = 0}2.
2We assume that if an individual is indi¤erent between two tax rates, he chooses the lowest
one.
12If ©(¿L
¡) > 1, we would have so large government expenditures (very high
g, b) that it could not be …nanced with any tax combination between 0 and 1.
We exclude this case.
3.2 The preferred tax choice of young individuals
Young individual with skill level e has two types of preferences: when employed
or unemployed. The optimal taxes for individual e will be either the optimal
tax rates of a worker with skill e, either the optimal choice of an unemployed,
depending on the one that gives him the highest utility.
3.2.1 Preferences of young unemployed individuals (¿L¤
u ;¿K¤
u )
Unemployed individuals choose the combination of labor and capital income
taxes that maximizes their utility over their lifetime:






(b(1 + r(1 ¡¿K)))] (19)
s.t.














and 0 · ¿K · 1 and 0 · ¿L · 1
The utility of unemployed only depends on ¿K. Hence, we can derive it with







1 + r(1 ¡¿K)
s¤
u < 0 (20)
with s¤
u de…ned by (7) and c¤
u = b
1+¯.
The utility of unemployed is decreasing in ¿K and will be maximized with
the minimal capital income tax compatible with the budget constraint:
¿K¤
u = maxf0;©(¿L
¡)g. The corresponding labor income tax will be: ¿L¤
u ´ Min
{¿L : ©(¿L) = 0} or ¿L
¡ . Their preferences are in this case similar to the one
of the retirees.
133.2.2 Preferences of young employed individuals (¿L¤
we;¿K¤
we)
Young employed individuals care about the present and the future and they are
subject to both labor income and capital income taxation.
Young working individual e will prefer the tax combination that maximizes
his indirect lifetime utility V w
e :
V w
e = ln [(ew(1 ¡ ¿L) ¡s¤
e)] +¯ ln [s¤
e(1 + r (1 ¡ ¿K))] (21)
s.t.



















An increase of labor income taxation has two e¤ects on the utility of the
worker: a direct negative revenue e¤ect by reducing the net wage income and

























d¿L de…ned by (16).




for employed worker (s¤
e) are always positive. When
d©(¿
L)
d¿L < 0 , the indirect
e¤ect is positive because the savings revenue are less taxed (and inversely when
d©(¿L)
d¿L > 0). Hence, a young employed individual will wish a positive tax rate
on labor income if an increase in the labor income tax allows a su¢ciently large
reduction in the capital income tax, namely if
d©(¿L)
d¿L is very negative. However,
the magnitude of
d©(¿L)
d¿L decreases with the ratio 1+r
1+n: the smaller n and the
larger r, the smaller the labor income tax basis, the larger the capital income
tax basis and the smaller will be the variation of ¿K following a change in ¿L.
14If the ratio 1+r
1+n is su¢ciently large, the utility of worker is decreasing in ¿L
and is maximized in ¿L¤
we = 0. Proposition 3 gives a su¢cient condition for the
utility of worker to decrease in ¿L:





d¿L < 0 for all
b
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In this case, the taxation mix maximizing the utility of every worker is : ¿L¤
we =
0 and ¿K¤
we = ©(0) if ©(0) · 1. If ©(0) > 1, ¿K¤
we = 1 and ¿L¤
we = Min
{¿L : ©(¿L) = 1}
See appendix 2 for a proof.
3.2.3 Preferences of young individuals
The optimal tax rate for a young individual is the one that provides him the
highest utility. Young individual with skill level e will compare the utility with
the optimal tax when employed and unemployed, namely the indirect utility
obtained in section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
Using (6), (19) and (21), it is easy to see that individual with skill level e
will prefer the taxation mix (¿K¤
u , ¿L¤
u ) i¤:


















· Re = 1 + r(1 ¡¿K¤
we)
· Ru = 1 + r(1 ¡¿K¤
u )
^ w = w(1 ¡¿L¤
we)
· Ru ¸ · Re with the strict inequality if the su¢cient condition of proposition




The left-hand side of (23) expresses the gain in the second period consump-
tion if he is an unemployed rather than a worker. The term on the right-hand
side re‡ects the potential gain in the …rst period if he works rather than being
unemployed. Since ¿K¤
u is the minimal capital income tax compatible with the
budget constraint, the return on capital is higher if he decides to be unem-
ployed ( · Ru ¸ · Re). On the other hand, young individual with skill level e must
also take into account the di¤erence in net income in the …rst period (namely
b¡ew(1¡¿L¤
we)), which may be positive or negative, depending on his skill level
and on his optimal tax rate in case he works ( ¿L¤
we). Hence, the optimal mix of
taxation for individual e will be the one of an unemployed i¤ the gain in term
of capital income in the second period outweighs the eventual loss in terms of
net wage.
Using (23), one can identify the individuals with such preferences. Individual













Relatively low-skilled individuals would choose a low capital tax and would
prefer to be unemployed. The threshold depends on ¿L¤
we and may be di¤erent
for each individual. If 1+r
1+n is su¢ciently high (proposition 3 satis…ed), this
threshold is identical for all individuals.
This threshold may be higher or lower than emin = b
w(1¡¿L), with ¿L the
e¤ective labor income tax resulting from the political process (not necessarily
16equal to ¿L¤
we, the tax rate preferred by individual e). If emin is higher than this
threshold, some low-skilled individuals (with e larger than this threshold but
lower than emin) would prefer to work with a labor tax rate ¿L¤
we , while they
will be e¤ectively unemployed. On the other hand, if the e¤ective labor income
tax rate is low (for example ¿L = 0 with emin = b
w), the threshold is higher
than emin
3: some low-skilled workers would prefer to be unemployed and would
vote for the taxation mix (¿K¤
u , ¿L¤
u ), even if the unemployment bene…t is lower
than their expected net wage in case they work.
Note also that the higher the unemployment bene…t b, the higher will be
the threshold. A higher unemployment bene…t increases therefore the number
of individuals that will prefer the mix of taxation (¿K¤
u , ¿L¤
u ).
3.3 The majority voting solution
Under proposition 3, we obtain corner solutions for the preferences of every
agent. Old individuals prefer the lowest possible capital income tax. Very
low-skilled young agents will have the same preferences. On the other hand,
high-skilled agents will favor the lowest possible labor income tax. According to
their preferences, population can be divided in two groups. The largest group
could impose his preferred taxation mix in case of majority voting. The lower
the population growth and the higher the unemployment bene…ts, the more
labor income taxation will be favored.
4 Illustrations
In section 3, we have seen that there exist three categories of individuals re-
garding to their preferences over the …nancing method of a given social security
system:
3The threshold is indeed always higher than b
w, the minimal skill level under which indi-
viduals will always be unemployed. See appendix 3 for a proof.
17- Old individuals who wish the lowest possible capital income tax that
respects the government budget constraint.
-Young individuals who prefer the optimal taxes for employed, with a
skill level such that the wage income gain is su¢ciently large to overcome an
potential loss in term of capital revenue.
- Young individuals who prefer the optimal taxes for unemployed.
Since the de…nition of these categories as well as the optimal tax combina-
tion in each case are complex expressions of parameters that obscure economic
intuition, we illustrate them by taking some speci…c realistic values for the pa-
rameters.
w 1 r 3:13
b 0:1 n 0:16
g 0:28 ¯ 0:4
Table 1: Parameters values
We normalize the wage rate w to 1. The value of the unemployment allo-
cation b satis…es (17). b in‡uences the unemployment rate since all individuals
with e < b
w will always be unemployed. With a uniform distribution, this would
imply a minimal unemployment rate of 10 percent4. The values of r and ¯
correspond respectively to annual values of 4:84% and 0:97. With these values,
the capital income/labor income ratio close to 3=7. The population growth cor-
responds to the annual growth rate of the EU in the nineties. The value of g
corresponds to a ratio of public consumption over output of almost 20% and
implies that the labor income tax will never be su¢cient to …nance the govern-
ment expenditures5. To test the sensitivity of our results, we made the same
4A more realistic distribution (implying a lower density at the extrema) would lead to a
smaller unemployment rate.
5The minimal capital income taxation compatible with the budget constraint is positive
and close to zero.
18exercise with higher and lower values of unemployment bene…ts ( b = 0:2 and
b = 0:05)6. This did not a¤ect the conclusion.
With the numbers of table 1, we obtain the following results.








Figure 1: The government budget constraint (capital income tax in Y-Axis and
labor income tax in X-Axis)
As stressed by equation (18), the government budget constraint is strictly
convex between 0 and ¿L
max and reaches a unique minimum in ¿L
¡ = 71:54%. For
lower values of ¿L, an increase in the labor income tax allows a reduction the
capital income tax. For ¿L > ¿L
¡, the labor supply e¤ect dominates the revenue
e¤ect and an increase in the labor income tax requires an increase in the capital
income tax to …nance the larger number of bene…ciaries (see equation (16)).
Old individuals prefer the lowest possible capital income taxation rate as
seen in section 3.1. Their optimal tax combination is ¿L
¡ = 71:54% and its
corresponding capital income tax ¿K¤
o = 1:30%.
6The values of g was adapted in each case to keep the minimal income close to zero
(respectively g = 0:14 and g = 0:37).
19Young individuals will compare their utility with their optimal tax rate
when working and when unemployed (see section 3.2).
When working, their utility is always decreasing in ¿L for all e (proof in
appendix 2). The reduction in net wage always overcomes the gain due to the
decrease in the taxation of savings that occurs when ¿L < ¿L
¡ (which is the
largest when ¿L = 0). They all maximize their utility by choosing ¿L¤
we = 0 and
¿K¤
we = 74:49%. Moreover, the higher their skill level e, the higher their indirect
utility V w
e for ¿L = 0 (see appendix 2).
For instance with e = 0:5; the utility depends in this way on ¿L when
working:




Figure 2: Indirect utility of a young employed as a function of labor income
tax
Young individuals with skill level e = 0:5 will only work when labor income
taxation rate is lower than 80%: Otherwise, his net wage is smaller than em-
ployment bene…t b. He will always prefer a zero labor income tax rate and a
corresponding capital income tax of 74:49%. With this tax combination, he
20obtains a utility of ¡1:5732.
When they are unemployed, their utility depends in this way on ¿K:






Figure 3: Indirect utility of a young unemployed as a function of capital in-
come tax
Their utility is always decreasing in ¿K asindicated in (20) since their savings
are positive. They will choose the lowest possible capital income tax : ¿K¤
u =
©(¿L
¡) = 1:30% and ¿L¤
u = ¿L
¡ = 71:54%. They will get a utility of ¡3:497.
Comparing the utility of individual when working and when unemployed,
one can see that every individual with a skill level higher than the threshold
e = 0:1265 will prefer ¿L¤
we and ¿K¤
we. This threshold is unique since all individuals
choose a zero labor income tax when they work. As can be seen in …gure 4,
individual e = 0:1265 gets the same utility when working (¿L = 0) and when
unemployed (¿L = 71:54%).
Hence, low-skilled individuals will prefer ¿L¤
u and a very low capital income
tax, even if the unemployment bene…t is lower than their expected net wage in





Figure 4: Indirect utility of a young individual with e = 0:1265 when working
and when unemployed as a function of labor income tax
case they work. With ¿L¤
we = 0; this is the case for individuals with skill levels
between [0:1;0:1265]. This happens because the gain due to a higher net capital
income more than outweighs this eventual loss in term of labor income.
With the parameter values of table 1, we obtain single-peaked preferences
and corner solutions for all individuals, a conclusion that holds for the alterna-
tive values as well. There exist three types of preferences : old individuals,
low-skilled individuals (with e < 0:1265) and high-skilled individuals. Two
features must be stressed. First, we notice that despite the heterogeneity of
young individuals, one can divide them in only two categories according to their
preferences, independently of their e¤ective employment status. High-skilled
young agents will prefer a zero labor income tax, while low-skilled will favor
a very low capital income tax. Second, we notice that low-skilled young in-
dividuals have the same preferences as the old. They could form a political
majority in this case, sustaining a very low capital income tax. With a lower b
22and less unemployed individuals, a majority (composed of high skilled agents)
could sustain a low labor income tax as in the United States.
5 Conclusion
The political support of capital income and labor income taxes has often been
studied separately. In this paper we examine the preferences of voters regarding
both taxes. We look at the way government consumption and a given social
security system with unemployment allocations can be …nanced. We consider
a double heterogeneity of voters : individuals belong to two generations and
there exists a continuity of skill level. We analyze the preferred taxation policy
mix of each agent. Every agent must take into account how each taxation may
diminish his revenue and to what extent a change of one tax requires a change of
the other tax. A tax modi…cation also in‡uences the endogenous labor supply.
Old agents always choose the lowest possible capital income tax rate and
the corresponding labor income tax rate. Despite the continuity of skillness of
young agents, young agents vote in only two ways. High-skilled voters prefer
the lowest possible labor tax to minimize its dominant negative revenue e¤ect.
Low-skilled agents on the other hand prefer a low capital income tax : they
vote as if they were unemployed and want to maximize capital income. With
a high unemployment allocation, a majority of voters (a coalition of old and
low-skilled young voters) sustain the lowest possible capital tax. With a low
unemployment bene…t, we obtain a majority (high-skilled agents) in favor of
low labor taxes.
Future research could compare the preferences of agents over labor versus
consumption taxes, a question often raised by politicians in recent years. We
could also endogenize the level of unemployment bene…ts.
236 Appendix
6.1 The shape of the budget constraint
The budget constraint can be written as:








2 (1 ¡ b2
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The slope of this function ©(¿L) is given by:
d©(¿L)
d¿L =
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Replacing emin and manipulating the expression, it can also be written as:
d©(¿L)
d¿L =










(1 ¡ ¿L)2 +
b4











To determine the shape of the function ©(¿L), we compute the value of its




























The …rst term in the multiplication is always positive. The second term is nega-

















w2¡b2 must be positive. This will be the case if
unemployment bene…ts are not too large: b
w <
p
5 ¡ 2 = 0:486. This leads to
the condition of equation (17).
24When ¿L = ¿L
max = 1 ¡ b









b2 > 0 (26)
Hence, the function ©(¿L) is downwards sloping in ¿L = 0 and upwards
sloping in ¿L
max. To compute the minimum of this function (¿L
¡), we need to
…nd the value of ¿L that satis…es:
d©(¿L
¡)
d¿L = 0 and 0 < ¿L
¡ < 1 ¡
b
w












w2(1 ¡¿L)2) = 0
This equation can be expressed as a second order equation in (1 ¡ ¿L)2 :
















If g < w
2 , this expression is concave (a < 0, b > 0, c > 0) and has only one
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The labor income tax rate ¿L
¡ is therefore the unique labor income tax that
minimizes the capital income tax.
256.2 The preferences of young employed individuals
The preferences of young working agent e with respect to the taxation mix can
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d¿L de…ned by (16).
Since the savings of employed individuals s¤
e is positive for all ¿L , this
expression can only become positive if
d©(¿
L)
d¿L is su¢ciently negative to make






d¿L ) positive and larger than ( ew). This
requires a small value of 1+r
1+n. A su¢cient condition for this expression to be
unambiguously negative is that 1+r
1+n is large enough.
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Since the …rst ratio is positive, the sign of
dV w
e
d¿L depends on the sign of the
expression between brackets. This expression (called ¤( b
2
w2(1¡¿L)2)) constitutes





w2(1 ¡ ¿L)2) = A
b4
w4(1 ¡ ¿L)4 + B
b2
w2(1 ¡ ¿L)2 + C
with A = ¿
L
































The sign of ¤( b
2
w2(1¡¿L)2) depends on the sign of A, B, C (determining the
sign of the two roots X1 and X2), which in turn depends on the magnitude of
the ratio 1+r
1+n:
C < 0 if 1+r













A < 0 if 1+r
1+n > 1 + 2¡¿L
¯(1¡¿L)
and C < A , B < A (with g < w
2 ) and, if ¯ < 1
2, C < B < A .




d¿L < 0 for all 0 < b2










Indeed, this condition guarantees that ¤( b
2
w2(1¡¿L)2) has at most one positive
root (if A > 0) and that this root (X2) is larger than one (B < 0, C < 0, and






1+n < 1 + 2¡¿L
¯(1¡¿L) , the function ¤(:)
is convex and is negative for all values of X1 < 0 < b2
w2(1¡¿L)2 < X2 > 1 . If
1+r
1+n > 1+ 2¡¿
L
¯(1¡¿L) , ¤(:) is concave and is negative for all values b
2
w2(1¡¿L)2 > 0
(the two roots are negative).
To determine a su¢cient condition independent of ¿L, we notice that :
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µ











Hence, a su¢cient condition for
dV w
e
d¿L < 0 for all 0 < b2
w2(1¡¿L)2 < 1 and



















































d¿L < 0 if b
2
w2(1¡¿L)2 is relatively small ( b
2
w2(1¡¿L)2 < X2 < 1). In addition,
if 1+r








d¿L > 0 for all
b2
w2(1¡¿L)2 > 0 . This may however imply a negative value for 1+r
1+n.
The illustrative values chosen satisfy this su¢cient condition:





















d¿L < 0 for all 0 < ¿L < ¿L
max
Therefore, ¿L¤
we = 0 8e > emin.
In addition, the indirect utility of a young worker is increasing in e as can
be seen in the following expression where we have substituted (6) in (21):
V w
e = ln [ 1
1+¯(ew(1 ¡¿L)] +¯ ln [
¯
1+¯ew(1¡ ¿L)(1 +r (1 ¡ ¿K))]
Hence, the lower the skill level of a young individual, the lower will be his
utility of working when ¿L¤
we = 0.
286.3 Limit value for the skill level determining the optimal
tax rate of young individuals


















^ w = b
w and · Re < · Ru (since ¿K¤






^ w > b
w and · Re · · Ru (since ¿K¤
u = maxf0;©(¿L
¡)g).
Hence, this condition is satis…ed in each case.
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